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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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vs.
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a Corporation,
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Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OTHELLO HICKMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
a Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, referred to hereafter as plaintiff, sued
respondent, who will be referred to hereafter as defendant,
to recover damages for injuries which he sustained in an
automobile-train accident. The trial of the cause in the
court below resulted in a verdict and judgment in defendant's favor, and plaintiff has brought this appeal to
secure a reversal of said judgment.
The accident occurred on October 30th, 1947, at
about 6:45 p. m. (Tr. 139), on U. S. Highway 91, at a
point approximately two miles southwesterly from Logan,
Utah, where a spur track of defendant crosses said highway. (Tr. 187, 227). The said highway at the scene
of the accident runs in a general northeasterly direction
toward Logan, and the spur track crosses the highway at
grade and at near right angles. ( Tr. 112). The highway
is paved with concrete and is level; with two traffice lanes
each 11 feet wide, (Tr. 112).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
There is a railroad sign commonly referred to as crossbucks, on the east side of the pavement and south of the
tracks. The defendant did not maintain any wig-wag
flashers at said crossing, nor were any flares or other lights
placed on the highway to warn motorists that said crossing was being used. There was no light placed upon any
of the railroad cars as they approached the crossing. ( Tr.
192.)
The spur track extends southeasterly; from the highway for about a half-mile to the main line, and it is not in
regular use. It is used principally during the fall of the
year to transport sugar beets from a storage pile located
on the sugar factory site on the west side of the highway.
At the time of the accident the defendant was pushing
about 8 empty sugar beet cars ahead of the engine which
was operating in reverse.
On the date of accident, plaintiff and Melvin Squires,
a business associate, were returning to Logan in the plaintiff's car. (Tr. 225, 226). As they approached a point
on said highway about three-tenths of a mile south of the
spur track they passed a high'Yay patrolman's car parked
on the west side of the highway facing south. Plaintiff
and Squires both observed the insignia on the patrolman's
car and the plaintiff then observed his speedometer to
ascertain if he was within the speed limit, and found the
indicator showed that plaintiff's car was then traveling
between 45 and 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 227, 228).
After plaintiff's car passed the patrolman's car the
latter turned around and proceeded northerly, following
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about hvo-tenths of a mile behind plaintiff's car. (Tr. 153 ).
The highway patrolman, Roland Reese, testified that the
plaintiffs car was traveling at a normal rate of speed at
the time it passed him and he estimated that the car was
travelli1g between 45 and 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 154).
The plaintiff proceeded northerly along said highway
at the same speed until he reached a point a short distance
south of the spur track when Squires said, 4:4:There comes
a train on the high,vay,,, and the plaintiff immediately
applied the brakes, and, as he testified, "As I applied my
brakes, then I saw the car coming on to the highway. I
had not seen the car until ~Ir. Squires yelled at me; and
I pushed my brake with all the force I could, and I could
see we were going to hit something." ( Tr. 228). All
four wheels skidded for a distance of 85 feet before colliding with the train. ( Tr. 166) The plaintiff's car collided
with the first railroad car entering the highway at the
rear of its front trucks, and before the train came to a
complete stop the front end of plaintiff's car was pulled
to the left and into the west lane on the highway, (See
Plaintiffs Exhibit B.) The brakes and light on plaintiff's
car were in good condition.
The first car approaching from the opposite direction
was operated by Mrs. Afton Archibald of Wellsville, and
as she reached the bridge over Blacksmith Fork River,
which is about 500 feet North of the spur track crossing,
(Tr. 188) she could see someone with what she took to
be a flashlight, waving said light up and down in front
of him. He was standing on the west side of the pavement
facing in her direction. She then saw the plaintiff's car
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coming from the opposite direction. She slowed down
but didn't stop. When she approached to within about
40 feet of the crossing (Tr. 189) she observed the railroad
car suddenly appear in front of her on the crossing, and
she "slammed" on the brakes. She then heard the screeching of the brakes on the plaintiff's car and immediately
thereafter the crash. There was no light on the train, and
just before the impact the man with the flashlight tu~ed
and ran across to the south side of the spur track. (Tr. 190)
She definitely heard the screeching of the brakes on plaintiff's car. ( Tr. 190~~) At the time of the impact the railroad car was not half-way across the concrete pavement,
and it moved after the impact so that she had to drive off
the pavement on the west side and momentarily stopped.
( Tr. 191). Mrs. Archibald testified that she did not observe the engine, nor did she hear the engine whistle or
the ringing of the bell. Neither did she observe any light
on the train nor any flares or lights at any place on the
highway. (Tr. 192).
Officer Reese testified - .:'There were no lights, that
it was an awful dark night, and that the moon had not
come up." As Reese drove up to the scene of the accident, he saw no lights on the railroad car nor on the highway at the crossing. ( Tr. 157, 158) As he drove along
behind plaintiff prior to the accident, and as he apprached the crossing he did not hear the train whistle nor
did he hear the bell ringing or hear any siren. (Tr. 158).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant, and assigns
the following errors upon which he relies for a reversal
of the verdict and judgment entered thereon:
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1. The court erred in admitting, over plaintiff's objection, defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. (1.,r. 132-134.)

The court erred in denying the following motion
made b~~ plaintiff: "~lR. CARTER: If the Court please,
I n1ove that these photographs be stricken from the record.
There is no showing as to when they were made, or the
conditions under which they were taken. Conditions have
changed. One of the witnesses testified that at the time
of the accident the bn1sh was high. Here it shows it
~, flat. THE COURT: The motion is denied."
(Tr. 384 ).
2.

3. The court erred in giving the last portion of instruction No. 7, viz.; "and the railroad company's employees have a right to presume that motorists on the highway
will drive with their cars under such control as to be able
to stop within the distance at which they can see objects
ahead." (Tr. 23).

4. The court erred in giving the last sentence of
instruction No 9, viz.; "After the cars of such a train are
upon and occupying or passing over a highway the presence of such train or cars lawfully upon such highway is
a sufficient warning to approaching travelers and such
travelers on the highway are bound to see such train of
cars on the highway in time to stop and to avoid colliding
therewith." ( Tr. 24).
5. The court erred in giving instruction No. 18. (Tr.
27, 28.)
6. The court erred in its refusal to give plaintiff's
requested instruction No. 1. ( Tr,. 40).
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7. The court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial. ( Tr. 99).
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I

The court erred (Assignment No. 1), in admitting
over plaintiff's objection defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6. ( Tr. 132-134. ) And the court also erred, (Assignment No. 2) in denying plaintiff's motion to strike said
exhibits (Tr. 384.) These exhibits were offered and admitted in evidence ( Tr. 132-124) on the cross examination of plaintiff's witness Benny Degn, a photographer,
who had been called by plaintiff to lay the foundation for
the admission of plaintiff's Exhibits B. C. D., and E (Tr.
120-123.) Plaintiff's objection to the admission of defendants exhibits, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 was based upon the ground
that no proper foundation' had been laid and that it was
not proper cross examination. (Tr. 134). And plaintiff's
motion to strike said exhibits ( Tr. 384) was made when
it appeared that defendant had failed to offer any evidence to show when the pictures were taken, or whether
the conditions and circumstances were the same when said
pictures were taken as they were when the accident occurred.
The plaintiff submits that as a matter of orderly proceedure a party should offer his evidence in his own time
and not poach upon the rights of the party who is then
introducing his side of the case. If a defendant may be
permitted to offer his evidence upon the cross examination
of plaintiff's witness, then the rule could be enlarged to
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the point where defendant would be presenting his case
simultaneously, and at the same time that plaintiff presents his case.
If defendanfs Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were taken in
the spring of 1948, then the conditions would be changed
to the extent that they would not present the true condition that existed on the date of the accident. If the individual \vho had taken these pictures had been produced,
the plaintiff could have cross-examined him as to the
time, \veather conditions, etc., and if it had been determined that the pictures were taken the following spring,
then they would be subject to the objection that they were
taken at a time too remote and after conditions surrounding the scene of the accident had changed. In order for
a picture to have any definite value as evidence, it must
be taken so near the time of the accident that it will reproduce the actual condition prevailing at the time of the
accident.
We earnestly submit that the court committed reversible error in admitting said exhibits on the showing made,
under the following authorities and cases:
In Goldstein~s Trial Technique, at page 328, section
396, under the heading of admissibility, the author states
the rule, as follows:
"However, if the conditions between the conditions at the time of the accident and the time when
the photograph was taken is of such a nature that
the result of the trial would probably be different if
the conditions as they formerly existed were shown,
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the photograph is not admissible. Where the view
at a railroad passing was obstructed by vegetation at
the time of the injury and the vegetation had all been
removed at the time of the photograph, it was held
that the photograph was not a correct representaion
and was not admissable. (citing Althoff vs. I. C. R.
Co., 227 Ill. 417.)
In 30 Am. Jur. 611, Section 731, the rule is laid
down:
14~~~-

of the taking of a picture are subject to change, a
photograph to be admissible, must have been taken
at the time of the transaction or before the situation
and corcumstances have undergone change. In many
instances photographs have been held inadmissible
on the ground that they were taken at a time too remote and when conditions had changed." (The follo,:ving cases are cited to support the above rule.)

I

rr

In Surratt vs. Robinson, ( Md. ) 135 Alt. 838, 50 A.L.R.
280, the court said:
"The second exception was taken to the action of
the trial court in permitting a photograph of the place
where the accident occurred to be offered in evi-
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Chicago etc., R. R. Co., vs. Crose, 73 N. E. 865, where
the Supreme Court of Illinois held:
"When the. situation and surrounding circumstances are subject to change, photographs, to be of
any value as evidence, must be shown to have been
taken at the time or when the situation and surroundings are unchanged."
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dence. As has been stated the accident occurred on
October 15, 1925, between 8 and 9 o'clock in the
n1orning, and the case was tried in the following
~larch. The photograph was taken by counsel in the
case, in the atternoon after the adjournment of court
pending the trial. From the testimony it appeared
that the conditions of the foliage, shrubbery, and
lighting were different at the time of the accident
than when the photograph was taken, and the photograph itself was obscure and indefinite in its details,
and it should not have been admitted in evidence."
II
The court erred (Assignment of error No. 3) in giving the following instruction to the jury, "And the railroad company's employees have a right to presume that
motorists on the highway will drive with their cars under
such control as to be able to stop within the distance at
which they can see objects ahead." ( Instn1ction No. 7,
Tr. 23 ).
The court also erred in giving the following instruction ( Assigirment C?f Error No. 4) "After the cars of such
train are upon and occupying or passing over a highway
the presence of such train or cars lawfully upon such highway is a sufficient warning to approaching travelers and
such travelers on the highway are bound to see such train
of cars on the highway in time to stop and to avoid colliding therewith." (Instruction No. 9, Tr. 24).
The foregoing instructions when read together, assume that the train was on the crossing all the time while
the plaintiff was a sufficient distance away from the crossSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing to have looked and stopped before colliding with the
defendant's train. They also assume that the railroad
cars were lawfully upon the highway. This is assuming
the important fact that is in issue.
Plaintiff submits that it was prejudicial error to give
these instruction since there is no evidence in the record
that defendant's train was occuping or passing over the
highway before plaintiff applied his-brakes. The evidence
of witnesses testifying for the pla~ntiff and defendant is,
that when the plaintiff applied his brakes the first car of
the train was then only entering upon the highway. (Tr.
228, 189, 319). The plaintiff testified that - "Just a little
way before we got to the track, my companion, Mr.
Squires, yelled to me: 'There cqmes a train on the highway.' xxx, I immediately applied my brakes, xxx. As I applied my brakes, then I saw the car coming on to the
highway." (Tr. 228 ).
Mrs. Archibald testified that as she approached the
crossing from the north, and when only about 40 feet from
the same that - "Then it seemed like all of a sudden this
railroad car loomed up in front of me. I slammed on my
brakes and I heard the scheeching of the brakes on the
plaintiff's car and the crash." (Tr. 189, 190). She further
testified that at the time of the collision the front end of
the railroad car was not half-way across the highway.
(Tr. 191.)
The defendant's witness Squires testified, (Tr. 319)
that he observed a train of cars coming out onto the highway. He saw the cars in the field first, and then he
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observed the first car entering the highway, "about eight
feet over." .:\t that time he hollered, "There is a train,"
( Tr. 320) and Plaintiffs Exhibit "B" plainly reveals the
fact that plaintiff's car collided with the front end of the
railroad car in the east lane of traffic, and the ·railroad car
then moved forward until the front end thereof reached
the west side of the pavement, dragging the front end of
plaintiff's car with it. These facts are plainly illustrated
by Plaintiff's Exhibits B, C, D, and E.
This evidence definitely shows that the tn1.in was approaching the highway when the plaintiff, Squires and
:\Irs. Archibald first saw it. At that instant the plaintiff's
car was too close to the crossing to stop before colliding
with the train. (Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp. 165
P. 2d. 877.)
We earnestly submit that the Court invaded the province of the jury and also misled the1n by giving these erroneous instructions.
This court has held repe~tedly that it is prejudicial
error to give an instruction on an issue not supported by
competent evidence. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1,
189 Pac. 74; Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Company
105 P. 2d. 347; and Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co. 133 P.
2d. 333.
In the case of Davis v. Midvale City, supra, this court
relied upon and quoted the general rule as laid down in
38 Cyc. 1612, 1613, as follows:
"It is improper to give an instruction announcing
a naked legal proposition, however correct it may be,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unless it bears upon and is connected with the issues
involved; and unless, further, there has been received
some competent evidence to which the jury may aply it. Such an instruction tends to distract the minds
of the jury from the real question submitted to them
for determination, and thereby mislead them, and, if
requested, may be proprly refused."
The same rule is recognized and adhered to in Shields
v. Utah Light & Traction Company, supra, where the judgment of the trial court was reversed and one of the grounds
for reversal resulted because the trial court gave an instruction on an element of damage which was pleaded, but
there was no evidence adduced at the trial to support it.
And in Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, the same
rule is reiterated in the 8th head note which reads:
"It is error to give instructions on a state of facts
which there is no evidence tending to prove, or which
undisputed evidence shows did not exist, even should
such instructions contain correct statements of law."
The holding of this court in the foregoing cases is
well supported by the courts in other jurisdictions. We
take the liberty of citing some recent cases from other
states:
Hancock et.al. v. Myers et.al. (Okla.) 176 P. 2d 820.
Magnolia Petroleum v. Galloway (Okla.) 83 P. 2d.

174.
Tosto v. City of Seattle et. al. (Wash.) 171 P. 2d. 194.
Lubliner v. Ruge (Wash.) 153 P. 2d. 694.
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Garrison v. Trowbridge ( J\lont.) 177 P. 2d. 464.
Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corporation (Cal.) 135 P.

2d. 42-!.
Clarke v. \ olpa Bros. (Cal.) 124 P. 2d. 377.
Hyman v. J\Iarket Ry. Co. (Cal.) 107 P. 2d. 485.
Gregg v. ~1cDonald (Cal.) 239 Pac. 373.
7

In the Oklahoma case of Hancock et.al. v. Myers.
et.al. supra, the Court held:
"The second ground of error is well taken. No
evidence was introdu~ed touching the rental value
of the premises or of damage suffered by plaintiffs by
reason of defendants' possession thereof. Such being
true, the submission of such issue to the jury was
error. "
In the case of Magnoli~ Petroleum v. Galloway, supra,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to give an instruction to the
jury which was not supported by the evidence and, in
arriving at this conclusion, the Court said:
Defendant contends that it was error for the
court to submit to the jury instructions concerning
gasoline which 'had not been tested' because the evidence does not ·show the defendant sold 'untested'
gasoline. An examination of the re_cord discloses that
it is neither alleged in the pleadings nor shown by the
evidence that the defendants sold gasoline to the
plaintiffs which had not been tested. The above instructions would permit the jury to find for the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tiffs because the defendants furnished untested gasoline. This was error. In White v. Oliver, 32 Okl. 479,
122 P. 156 par. 5, of the syllabus, reads: 'It is error
to give an instruction, presenting to the jury a theory
o fthe case, when there is no evidence to support the
theory.' "
In the case of Tosto v. City of Seattle, supra, held that
it was prejudicial error to give an instruction on the last
clear chance doctrine~ "Where the facts do not justify it."
And the Supreme Court of Washington, in Lubliner
v. Ruge, supra, reversed a judgment in favor of defendant,
because one of the instructions stated that the defendant
had a right to assume certain rights in crossing the intersection where the accident occurred. In holding that the
instruction was incorrect, the court said:
"This instruction was incorrect from two standpoints: It relieved the driver of the car of the duty
to anticipate that the red light might turn against
him and to so regulate his speed as to be able to
avoid entering the intersection against it, and it cast
upon the appellant the duty to look for the approach
of the car and to give it the right of way even thougp
he had the green light in his favor when he entered
the intersection." ·
And in the Montana case, Garrison v. Trowbridge,
177 P. 2d. 464, at page 467, the Court said:
"Furthermore, the court erred in giving instruction No. 15 reading: 'You are instructed that all traffic, including pedestarians, must, when they approach
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an intersection of a city street in the City of Great
Falls, and Scond .A.venue North, the same being a
through street; stop and look before entering such
intersection for the purpose of crossing the avenue.'
To the giving of that instruction plaintiff objected
upon the ground 'that there was a complete lack of
any evidence in the case upon which the giving of
such an instruction can be predicated.' The objecto the instn1ction should have been sustained. There
\Vas no evidence showing that deceased did not stop
before entering the intersection. It is not proper to
give an instruction on an issue concerning which there
is no evidence. (53 A.m. Jur. 455.)
In the case of Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corporation,
the appellate court reversed a judgment in defendant's
favor and, in so holding, the court said:
"The prejudice suffered by plaintiffs by the failure to give such an instruction was emphasized when
the court in another instruction told the jury that
plaintiffs could not recover if their injuries were a
'result of the mutual fault and negligence of the defendant and of the plaintiffs.' The fact that this instruction was given in a paragraph dealing with the
measure of damages does not destroy its effect, for
the jury is presumed to have heard and heeded all of
the instructions given by; the court. In their answer
defendants pleaded contributory negligence but no
evidence was presented at the trial which gave the
slightest support to these allegations. The instructons
concerning the 'mutual fault' of the defendants arid
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of the plaintiffs should not ha~e been given. Chapman v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 85 Cal. App. 69, 74,
258 P. 1006.
In Clarke v. Volpa Bros., supra, the appellate court
of Califol,"'lia, reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant, because the lower couFt had given an instruction to
the jury that .....

"The plaintiff could not assume, or act or reply
upon the assumption that he would not be injured by
defendantl truck or by any other truck passing by
the place he was, but he was required to keep such
lookout for the trucks as under similar circumstances
an ordinary prudent person would have kept for his
own safety and protection." (Italics supplied).
In holding that the giving of the foregoing instruction
was reversible error, the appellat~ court said:
"There was a conflict in the evidnce as to whether appellant was in a position of danger. Appellant
also adduced testimony showing that the truck struck
him after working hours were over and at a time when
the advent of a truck was not to be expected. It was
a question, therefore, for the jury to determine whether the truck had a right to be wherever plaintiff
was at the time of the accident and whether their
rights were 'equal in every respect.'"
~

In the case of Hyrum v. Market St. Ry. Co. et.al.,
supra, the California Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court for the principal reason that the trial court
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gave an instn1ction on the question as to whether or not
the accident was unavoidable, 'vhen there was no evidence
to support it. In passing on this question, the court said:
"The trial court instructed the jury that the verdict should be for defendants if the jury believed the
collision resulted_ from unavoidable accident. There
was no direct or indirect evidence that the collision
was the result of an ~able accident. The instruction, under the facts, was clearly misleading to the
jury, and the giving of it was error prejudicial to appellant. Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Cal. App. 307, 22 P.
2d. 545.
The District Court of Appeal in California in the case
of Gregg v. McDonald, 239 Pac. 373, held that the trial
court gave an instruction not warranted by the evidence,
and the court said:
''We agree with appellant that it was calculated
to mislead the jurors and to a~fect their conclusion on
the amount of damages to be awarded by them. We
are satisfied, therefore, that the giving of it was prejudicial error necessitating a reversal of the judgment.
The n1le deducible from the authorities is this: 'Such
instructions only should be given as are based upon
legitimate evidence in the case.' "

III
·-... _. •:t<

The plaintiff contends that the trial court committed
reversible error, (Assignment of Error No. 5) in giving
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fends agai;nst the general rule with respect to the form and
sufficiency of an instruction on contributory .negligence.
From 45 C. J. 1315, Section 925, we 'iHQte 925, we quote
the general rule as follows:
"An instruction on contributory negligence must
not be misleading, nor confusing, nor inconsistent
with other instructions given, nor invade the province
of the jury, nor assume the existence of an unproved
fact, nor single out and give undue prominence to isues, theories, or evidence."
We earnestly submit that instruction No. 18 is manifestly against the foregoing rule because it is suggestive,
misleading and confusing. For instance, using the word
"that" at the beginning of each p:;tragraph is suggestive
that what is stated in each paragraph is true even though
there is no evidence in the record to support it. In paragraph -(a) the language there used could easily mislead
the jury into believing that an employee of the defendant
was waving his lantern toward the plaintiff an? that the
plaintiff should have seen the light from said lantern in
in time to have stopped before arriving at the track. Yet,
the evidence clearly showed from the testimony of Mrs.
Archibald, (Tr. 190) and defendant's witness, Squires,
( Tr. 322) that the employee did not turn his light in the
direction from which plaintiff was approaching until after
plaintiff had applied his brakes, and then it was too late
to serve any useful purpose.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) both suggest that plaintiff
was exceeding the speed lirnit. Yet the evidence in the
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record shows that he was driving between 45 and 50 miles
per hour, a legal rate of speed. Plaintiff testified that he
checked the speed when he passed Officer Reese's car and
the speedometer read bet~een 4.5 and 50 miles per hour,
(Tr. 227-228) and Officer Reese testified that plaintiff
was driving normally. (Tr. 154.)
The same thing might be said of paragraphs (g) and ·
(h). Paragraph (g) assumes that the train was plainly
visible to the plaintiff and that he failed to stop within
10 feet of the track, and paragraph (h) assumes that because plaintiff did not expect the train to be on the track
that for that reason he "failed to keep a proper lookout."
The suggestions and assumptions included in every paragraph of instruction No. 18, are clearly against the undisputed evidence in the case, but by their peculiar phraseology the jury could become confused and misled into
believing that plaintiff was guilty of violating one or all
of said paragraphs.
This instruction informed the jury that in order to find
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence they need
only find that one of the particulars listed in said instruction was true. It is submitted that there is no evidence
to support some of the particulars mentioned. For instance, the jury may have been so far confused and misled
by the instruction that they decided that plaintiff was ·
guilty of negligence under paragraph No. (g). There is
no manner of determing under which paragraph, if any,
the jury found plaintiff had violated. But suppose that
the jury found that plaintiff was gui~ty of negligence under
paragraph (g), then we submit that there is no evidence
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in the record to prove that the train was plainly visible to
the plaintiff in sufficient time for him to h~ve avoided a
collision by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care.
IV

It is respectfully submitted that the court erred (Assignment No. 6) in its refusal to give plaintiff's requested
instruction No. 1 ( Tr. 40) .
It is earnestly contended by the appellant that the
statute, section 77-0-14, as amended, applies particularly
to public crossings on the main line, but does not afford
sufficient protection on a seldom used spur track which
crosses a publi~ highway in a rural or country area, and
without the benefit of ,urban lights. This track was used
for switching cars from the main line· across the public
highway to and from a storage beet pile in the fall of the
year. The testimony showed that on the night in queston
it was very dark. (Tr. 155, 187).
In a factual situation of this kind the courts have uniform~y held that the railroad company is bound to exercise
special precautions to avoid injuries to persons lawfully
using the highway. It was plaintiff's theory throughout
the trial of this case, that since the engine, operating in
reverse, was backing the cars toward the crossing at night
and after dark, and that there was no automatic lighting
equipment installed at the crossing to warn the public,
that it was the duty of the ~efendant, in the exercise of
ordinary care, to maintain a look-out or give a signal or
warnng at the crossing to travelers using the highway of
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the presence or approach of the train of cars toward said
highway, so that the travelers would be able to stop in
tune to avoid a collision "·ith said train.
'Ve therefore submit that under the facts and circumstance in this case as 01:1tlined above, it was the duty of the
trial court to instruct the jury on the common law duty
of the defendant, as ·setforth in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 1. And it is earnestly contended that the
court committed reversal error in its failure and refusal to
give such instruction. It will be seen that the court's refusal was unqualifiedly made. (Tr. 40). In this connection, it will also be observed that the trial court was of the
definite opinion that the defendant's duty was determined
by the provisions of the statute, and that the common law
duty_ did not apply to the factual situation as presented
by the evidence in the case at bar. To show that the trial
court was of the opinion that the statutory duty only applied to this case, we quote herein the first sentence of
Instruction No. 9, as follows:
c:c:y ou are instructed that where a train crew is
engaged in a switching movement, such as is involved
in this case, the laws of Utah do not require the train
crew to put out flares on a highway when crossing
such highway at night, nor do they require cars in
such train to be lighted or carry any lights upon
-them. "

We submit that while the foregoing instruction was
a correct statement of the rule as provided by the statute
respecting the duty of the defendant, yet, it. should have
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been followed by plaintiff's requested instruction No. 1,
which embodied the comn1on law rule. By giving the
foregoing instruction and then refusing to give plaintiff's
requested instruction, it had the effect of instructing the
jury that no lights on the cars, or lights on the highway
were required. This effectually precluded plaintiff from
presenting his theory of the case to the jury as framed
by his pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial.
The common law rule is well stated in 52 C. J. 213,
Section 1811, with respect to backing cars toward or over
a public crossing as follows:
"But the fact that the company is engaged in
switching does not relieve it from exercising care in
crossing a public street, and since such acts are especially dangerous, it is bound to exercise special precautions to avoid injuries to persons lawfully on or
approaching the track, particularly where the crossing is infrequently used for switching purposes.
(Klotz v. Winona, Railroad Company, (Minn.) 71 N.
W. 257.) It is negligent if it backs its engines or
trains or runs unattended cars without proper lookouts, or without proper lights, or other signals or
warnings, and without taking such other precautions
for the safety of travelers as the circumstance reasonably require. xxx, Such light should be of a kind calculated to attract the attention of travelers at or near
the crossing, indicating to them the approach of the
train toward the crossing." (Italics Supplied.)
And the common law rule is well stated in a note in
15 A.L.R. 1527, as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
"Ordinarily it is the duty of a railroad company
to have after dark a conspicuous light on a forward
car pushed by a locomotive, on a moving car disconnected from the locomotive, or on the tender of a
locomotive backing without cars, when the car or
locomotive is passing over a street or highway crossing; and the failure of the company to have a light so
placed when the car or locomotive is passing over the
cros~ing is negligence sufficient to hold the company
liable for a consequent injury to or death of a person
struck at the crossing while exercising reasonable care
for his own safety."
It must be remembered that although defendant's
brakeman was on the highway; the evidence clearly shows
that he was flagging only against traffic approaching on
said highway from the northerly direction. The witness,
Mrs. Archibald, definitely testified that the man flagging
her did not tum toward the south until after she heard the
brakes screeching on plaintiff's car. She thought that was
what caused the man (the brakeman) to turn toward the
south side of the track. That was just seconds before
the impact. (Tr. 190, 190}~). The defndant's witness,
Squires, testified that he did not see the flagman until after
plaintiff had applied the brakes and then it was too late.
And that he did not see any light of any kind before then.
( Tr. 322, 323). The plaintiff testified that he did not
see the flagman at all. ( Tr. 233). Thus it definitely
appears that for some reason the brakeman entirely forgot
about traffic approaching on the highway from the south.
He was giving his entire at_tention to the traffic approaching from the north, until he heard the brakes on
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plaintiffs car begin to screech, then for the first time he
turned his attention in the direction from which plaintiff
was approaching.
It "'rill therefore be definitely seen that so far as plaintiff was concerned there was no flagman on the crossing,
and the plaintiff, Squires, and Mrs. Archibald all testified
that they did not hear the train whistle nor did they hear
the engine bell ringing. ( Tr. 192, 233, 322, 323). Thus, the
statutory duty to ring the bell and sound the whistle was
unavailing as a warning to travelers using the highway at
the time the accident occurred. This was no doubt caused
by the fact that the engine was lacing away from the highway and was too far away to be heard by motorists traveling in either direction on the highway.
It is therefore submitted that under the facts and
circumstnaces prevailing at the crossing that the only
means by which the defendant could convey notice to
motorists approaching the crossing was by a light or flares.
As the flagman failed to turn or show his light toward
cars approaching from the south on said highway; and
since the defendant had no lights or flares posted upon
th.e cars or upon the highway at said crossing, it will therefore be seen that said crossing was completely in the dark,
so far as concerned motorists approaching said crossing
from the south. Thus the defendant utterly failed to give
any warning of any kind to motorists, including the
plaintiff, traveling along said highway in a northerly direction.
The rule applying to this factual situation is pertinently stated in 45 C. J. 951, section 510;
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'"But in order to be proper for consideration in
this connection the warning must be sufficiently definite to infonn hiln of the danger and must be given
in time fo1· h iln to escape it.~~ ( Italics supplied ) .
When the trial court refused to give the jury an instnlctiop. on ~e common law rule (plaintiff's requested
instn1ction No. 1 ) but on the contrary instn1cted the jury
that it \vas not the duty of defendant to put out flares on
a highway##~ nor require lights upon the (railroad) cars,
(first sentence instn1ction No. 9, Tr. 24), the jury was misled into believing that the d~fendanfs duty merely required ringing the bell and sounding the whistle. In this
connection it should also be remembered that on the date
of the accident it \Vas cold enough that car windows would
be closed, and motorists would not be able to hear the
bell or the whistle, but they could not fail to see a light
ahead on the highway. Under these conditions prevailing
at the time of the accident, it was the duty of the trial
court to instruct th~ jury with respect to the common law
duty of the defendant, and the plaintiff and appellant
therefore submits that it was prejudicial and reversable
error to refuse to submit to the jury the full duty of the
defendant with respect to protecting travelers as they approached said crossing.
This court in a very early case, English v. Southern
Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Utah 407, held that the common law duty
of a railroad company to provide warnings in addition to
the statutory requirements are necessary if the exigencies
and circumstances of the case require it. In this respect,
the court said:
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" 'The duty may exist outside the statute to provide flagmen or gates or other adequate warning appliances, if the situation of the crossing reasonably
requires that - and of this you are to judge - and it
depends upon the general rule that the company must
use its privilege of crossing the streets on its surface
grade with due and reasonable care for the rights of
other persons using the highway, with proper care
and caution on their part., " (Italics Supplied).
To support the foregoing doctrine this court in the
English case quoted the following excerpt from Railway
Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442:
" 'It is also held in many of the States (in fact,
the rule is well-nigh, if not quite universal,) that a
railroad company, under certain circumstances, will
not be held free from negligence, even though it may
have complied literally with the terms of a statute prescribing certain signals to be given, and other precautions to be take by it, for the safety of the traveling public at crossings.' "
The facts in that case are similiar to the case at bar,
as the defendant was engaged in switching cars backwards
over one of the city streets which traversed the raihoad
yards in Ogden City.
A ~4i~g-uri Qass, 1~7 8.lfl/. ggg, ura~ apflea:led: t" tfte
S:bipreFHs CeaFt of t:Be UBited St:atss aRd r8fl8F~ed iB 248
Ll,.S 422, 61 I. ed ~g6. In an annotation in 15 A. L. R.
1528, several cases are annotated, including the case of
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., vs. Sharp, 63 Fed. 532, and the
Court laid down the following rule which we earnestly
contend applies to the facts in the case at bar:
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~'Independently

of a statute requiring railroad
co1npanies to ring a bell or sound a whistle at all public crossings, a railroad company, in backing a train
of flat cars over a public crossing after dark, without
a brakeman or light or other signal on them to warn
the public of their coming, is guilty of negligence.
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sharp (Fed.) supra."
In the case of John Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.,
decided by the United States Supreme Court and reported
in 91 A.L.R. 1049, the fourth headnote relates to the railroads duty at a public crossing and reflects the opinion
of the court. The headnote reads as follows :
''The giving of the statutory signals does not exhaust the duty of a railroad company at a highway
crossing when to its knowledge, there is special dange-r to the traveler through obstructions on the roadbed narrowing the field of vision.~~ (Italics Supplied).
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit,
illinois Cent. R. Co., v. Davis, 32 Fed. (2d) 232, had under
consideration the question whether the statutory or common law rule was applicable to an accident occurring at
a railroad crossing outside the city limits. In holding that
the common law rule applied, the court said:
"The purpose, as we have said, of this provision
of the statute, in view of subsections 1 and 2 which
were enacted at the same time, and which comprehensively dealt with crossings outside of cities, was
to protect those within the city and not those outside
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
it. Even, therefore, if there was a failure to comply
with this statute, there was on that account no violation of duty to the decedent. The liability as to him

was determinable under the law applicable to the
crossing tvhere the accident occurred - the common
law.'' (Italics Supplied).
In the California case of Peri v. Los Angeles Junction
Ry. 137 Pac. ( 2d) 441, at page 444, in respect to the necessity for the use of lights on a freight train, the court
said:
"There were no lights on the train except the
headlight of the engine, the beam of which was obscured from Guida's view after the engine passed the
crossing by the buildings on the south side of the
tracks. The wigwag signal was not operating by
sounding, lighting or moving, while Guida was approaching the crossing. There were no flares exhib-

ited, watchman present, or any device to warn of the
presence of the train moving on the crossing other
than above mentioned.~' (Italics Supplied).
In Chespeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Folkes, 18 S. E. 2d.
309, the Supreme court of Virginia said:
"It is well settled that aside from statutory requirements, a railroad is under a common law duty to
warn motorists of the approach of a train at a crossing. A railroad is likewise under a similar duty to
warn motorists of the proximity of a backing train.
(citing southern Railway Co. v. Campbell, 1 S. E.
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255). The evidence adduced by plaintiff here to the
effect that the backing train had no lights, gave no
signal, and that the brakeman flagged the automobile
after it had stopped on the tracks and after it was too
late for ~Ir. Entwisle to get out of the path of the
approaching box cars is sufficient to spell negligence
on the part of the defendant."
We submit that the foregoing factual situation is almost identical with the facts· in the case at bar.
The following cases were cited in the note in 15 A. L.
R. 1527, supra, and they follow the rule therein stated:
''In Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Terrell
(Ind.) 95 N. E. 1109, it was held to be negligence
at common law for a railroad company to fail to give
any signals by whistle or bell, or by having a light
on the forward car~ while its train was backing in the
dark and over a crossing.='=' (Italics Supplied).
"In Di Grazio v. Pennsylvania R. Co. ( 1918) 261
Pa. 364, 104 Atl. 596, an action for the wrongful death
of the plaintiffs husband, it was held that there was
a case for the jury; it appearing that he was struck
at a street crossing in the nighttime by a car pushed
by a locomotive moving at the rate of 15 miles per
hour, and there was no light on the car, and no bell
rung or other warning given of the approach of the
train."
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CONCLUSION
For the reason that the trial Court committed error
as hereinbefore set forth, plaintiff respectfully submits that
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
plaintiff should be awarded a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. NELSON,
SAMUEL J. CARTER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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